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REJECTING SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
IN PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION
Howard M Wasserman*
INTRODUCTION
Constitutional cause litigation often produces far-reaching procedural
innovations, as courts figure out how to incorporate substantively unique
cases into existing judicial structures.1  In the litigation over marriage
equality and the validity of laws prohibiting or declining to recognize same-
sex marriages, one procedural complication and innovation has involved
defendant standing-who can defend litigation challenging the
constitutionality of state and federal rules, both at the trial level and on
appeal from an adverse judgment.
One example is Perry v. Brown, a challenge to the constitutionality of
California's Proposition 8, a voter-enacted ban on same sex marriage. 2
Plaintiffs named the governor, attorney general, and several other executive
branch officers as defendants. When all the named defendants declined to
defend Prop. 8's constitutionality, the district court allowed the initiative's
proponents to intervene to defend the law. 3
The problem arose when the district court invalidated the marriage
limitation and permanently enjoined enforcement of the ban; the named
officer-defendants declined to appeal the judgment, raising the question
whether the initiative's supporters, although proper intervenors in the trial
court, had standing to initiate litigation at the appellate level. The Ninth
Circuit ordered briefing on the issue, then certified to the California
Supreme Court the question of whether the initiative's proponents enjoyed
particular special interests under state law that they could protect in
litigation, including on appeal.4
The California Supreme Court concluded that the initiative's proponents
had authority under state constitutional and statutory law to litigate on
behalf of the government and to assert California's interests in the validity
* Professor of Law, FIU College of Law. Thanks to Thomas Baker and Matthew Hall for
their comments.
1. Cf Burt Neuborne, The Gravitational Pull of Race on the Warren Court, 2010 SUP.
CT. REv. 59. 60 (arguing that concern for racial injustice and state institutional failure shaped
the Warren Court's decisions in a range of areas).
2. Perry v. Brown. 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
3. Id. at 1068.
4. Id. at 1070 (citing Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry V), 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir.
2011)).
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of state law where elected officials declined to do so.5 The Ninth Circuit
accepted the state court's answer and permitted the sponsors to appeal the
judgment. 6
A second example involves challenges to the constitutionality of section
3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which, for purposes of all
federal law, defines marriage as consisting only of a "legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife" and spouse as "a person of
the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."7 In 2011, the Department of
Justice decided that non-recognition of same-sex marriage warranted
heightened scrutiny, which, in DOJ's view, DOMA-influenced federal law
could not survive. Attorney General Eric Holder notified Speaker of the
House John Boehner of this new litigation posture, and of DOJ's
unwillingness to defend DOMA in several district court cases in which
standard of scrutiny was an open question.8 Boehner then convened the
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG), which retained outside counsel
and intervened in several district court actions to provide a vigorous
constitutional defense. 9
The question that has been litigated and discussed is whether these
substitute defendants should have standing to intervene in the litigation, at
trial and on appeal, in the face of the refusal of the relevant named
executive officers to do so. Matthew Hall's thoughtful and thorough article
in the Fordham Law Review mines these issues, creating the first direct
analytical framework for deciding whether someone has standing to be a
defendant in a case (including pursuing the case on appeal from an adverse
judgment), independent of the standing of plaintiffs.10 Descriptively, Hall
is correct in labeling this a matter of standing because that is how courts
treat it, and his framework and analysis is beneficial to courts when viewing
this as a justiciability issue. Hall is also correct that the constitutional
authority of someone to defend should be considered independent of the
constitutional right of the plaintiff to sue. He establishes a faithful Article
III analysis that also ensures that laws can be vigorously defended.11 This
is an important goal, given the public benefit of removing hurdles to
5. Perry v. Brown (Perry V1l). 265 P.3d 1002. 1025 (Cal. 2011).
6. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1070-75.
7. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). More precisely, these lawsuits challenge all provisions of the
United States Code affected by DOMA's limited definition of marriage and spouse. See Neal
Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 507,
509 n.4 (2012).
8. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker of the U.S.
House of Reps. (Feb. 23, 2011). available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/
February/ 1 1-ag-223.html.
9. Matthew I. Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1564-66 (2012): see, e.g.. Revelis v. Napolitano. No. 11 C 1991.
2012 WL 28765, at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2012); Windsor v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 2d
320, 323 25 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
10. See generally Hall, supra note 9.
11. Id. at 1575-84.
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litigation and ensuring vigorous defense of the constitutionality of federal
and state law.12
This response Essay argues that this dispute ought not really be about
standing, in the sense of Article III's requirement of a case or controversy
between interested adverse parties with a personal stake in the outcome of
the case. We speak about it as standing only because of the questionable
doctrine of sovereign immunity (of both the state and federal governments),
under which the government entity cannot be sued eo nomine (by name) in
federal court. Sovereign immunity forces plaintiffs to sue executive branch
officers responsible for enforcing a given law. This, in turn, presents
defendant standing questions when, as in the marriage equality cases,
someone seeks to defend the law at trial and on appeal when the named
responsible officer refuses to defend or defends on less than favorable
grounds.
The argument here is that we can and should reject sovereign immunity
of the federal or state governments, removing a doctrine that is inconsistent
with the constitutional and political structure of the United States.13
Instead, plaintiffs should be able to sue the government (or relevant
government department or agency) by name when seeking to enjoin the
enforcement of unconstitutional laws, thus bringing the case caption in line
with reality. By eliminating the need to identify individual defendants, we
remove the issue from the rubric of Article III and standing. The
government is the named defendant with a stake in the outcome of litigation
and that provides the adverseness that Article III demands.
I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL OFFICER LITIGATION
The conversation about standing (at trial and on appeal) and intervention
in the marriage equality cases, which prompted Hall's article, results from
the prevailing regime of sovereign immunity, under which a sovereign
cannot be sued in its own name absent consent. 14
Sovereign immunity originates in monarchies, where the root power of
government has been placed in the hands of one, divinely decreed person.
It has been criticized as theoretically inconsistent with republican
government where, at the theoretical level, the people are sovereign and the
source of lawful authority, government acts on the people's behalf, and the
expectation is that government should be accountable to the people for its
conduct.15 Steve Gey labeled this "ultimate sovereignty" and argued that
12. See Joan Steinman, Shining a Light in a Dim Corner: Standing to Appeal and the
Right to Defend a Judgment in the Federal Courts, 38 GA. L. REV. 813, 832 (2004)
(describing the values served by allowing persons to litigate and appeal).
13. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity. 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201. 1201
(2001) ("Sovereign immunity is an anachronistic relic and the entire doctrine should be
eliminated from American law.").
14. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank. 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907); Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against
Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1963).
15. See U.S. CONST. amend X; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706. 783-85 (1999) (Souter. J..
dissenting); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT
SIDES WITH THE STATES 152 (2002); Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 1201-02; Lauren K.
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"no government is truly 'sovereign' in the ultimate sense because all
governments must obtain their authority from those who consent to the
exercise of that authority over them"-in other words, the people.16
Sovereignty "cannot be found in America in the form classically
imagined," 17 where authority is divided among three branches and not
derived from, or vested in, any one branch.
Immunity is a necessary product of notions of royal divinity; the dignity
of the prince and the affront to royal dignity that comes with hailing the
sovereign into court without his consent. It "represent[s] a view of the
sovereign as divinely commissioned, and of the citizen as lacking power
and agency," which means that it "fit[s] poorly with both American self-
understanding and the founding generation's belief in democratic
accountability."1 8 Moreover, it is incoherent to ascribe dignity to a legal
entity or for it to suffer an affront to that dignity.
Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has imported sovereign immunity
to the state and federal governments as entities, protecting them from all
private lawsuits. This has been explicit at the state level, initially driven by
the text of the Eleventh Amendment, 19 but broadened to include immunity
from suits by any private individual, regardless of source of law, court, and
plaintiffs citizenship. 20  Chief Justice Marshall identified sovereign
immunity for the federal government as "universally received opinion." 21
This immunity is complete. Although the Court unfortunately speaks
loosely of sovereign immunity as prohibiting actions against states for
damages, 22 the doctrinal reality is that neither a state government nor
federal government can ever be the named defendant (absent waiver or
abrogation, neither of which is present in constitutional litigation),
regardless of the relief sought.
State sovereign immunity is even more questionable as applied to
lawsuits under federal law or in federal court. The essence of sovereignty is
the power to make the legal rules that bind actors, and the rationale for
sovereign immunity is that it is logically impossible for an individual to
have and enforce a right against the authority that makes the legal rule on
which the right depends. 23 Gey labeled this "immediate sovereignty"-the
power to "issue commands and have them obeyed." 24  States are not
immediately sovereign as to the Federal Constitution or federal law because
Robel, Sovereignty and Democracy: The States' Obligations to Their Citizens Under
Federal Statutory Law, 78 IND. L.J. 543, 550-51, 554 (2003).
16. Steven G. Gey. The Myth of State Sovereignty. 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601, 1626 27
(2002).
17. NOONAN. supra note 15. at 152.
18. Robel, supra note 15, at 553; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 1201-02.
19. Alden. 527 U.S. at 713: see U.S. CONST. amend. XI (eliminating federal jurisdiction
over suits "commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State").
20. Alden. 527 U.S. at 713-14.
21. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,411-12 (1821).
22. Eg.. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1333 (2012).
23. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907); Robel, supra note 15, at 550.
24. Gey, supra note 16, at 1631.
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they do not issue those legal commands; they derive from the federal
government (or from the people acting through the federal government).
Whatever the merits of the sovereign immunity of states from suit under
their own laws, it should be inapplicable when the state is sued under laws
that derive immediately from an entity other than the state. 25
Interestingly, but often overlooked, the bar to suing states over the
constitutional validity of state law (as in Perry) comes not directly from
state sovereign immunity but indirectly from statutory interpretation
influenced by immunity. The vehicle for challenging the constitutionality
of state laws is 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides individuals with an
equitable action against "every person" who, under color of state law,
violates federal law, as by attempting to enforce an unconstitutional law.26
A state is not a person for section 1983 purposes, an interpretation driven
by sovereign immunity and the absence of a clear statement or legislative
history showing congressional intent to override sovereign immunity. 27
But judicial interpretation of a federal statute remains subject either to
judicial overturning or congressional override. Under current state
sovereign immunity doctrine, Congress may abrogate immunity through
appropriate enforcement legislation enacted pursuant to its powers under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 28 Section 1983, which authorizes
private remedial actions against conduct that itself violates section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment (including the incorporated Bill of Rights), has
been recognized as appropriate legislation through which Congress may
constitutionally subject a state to suit. 29  Congress thus could enable
litigation directly against states simply by amending section 1983 to define
"person" to include states.
At least as to constitutional claims, the answer to sovereign immunity has
been to redirect litigation to the executive branch officers responsible for
enforcing a law alleged to be constitutionally invalid. The plaintiff names
the officer as defendant in an action seeking an injunction or other
prospective relief prohibiting continued or future enforcement of the invalid
law; that officer will be subject to the judicial command not to violate the
Constitution going forward and to contempt for violating the order. The
Court explicitly recognized this litigation approach as to state officers in Ex
parte Young, 30 has affirmed it as an essential limitation on sovereign
25. Alden. 527 U.S. at 797-98 (Souter, J., dissenting): Gey, supra note 16, at 1658.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
27. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58. 64-67 (1989): Quern v. Jordan.
440 U.S. 332, 340-43 (1979).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (granting Congress power to enforce the other
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment).
29. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158-59 (2006); see also Howard M.
Wasserman, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and John Doe Defendants: A Study in Section 1983
Procedure, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 837-38 (2003).
30. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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immunity, 31 and has implicitly accepted the theory with respect to
injunctive actions against federal executive officers. 32
This doctrinal landscape explains the procedural posture of much of the
marriage equality litigation. Perry named as defendants, among other
executive officers, then-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and then-
Attorney General Jerry Brown; Brown then replaced Schwarzengger as
defendant-Governor and Kamala Harris replaced Brown as defendant-
Attorney General. Similarly, one DOMA lawsuit challenged the refusal by
the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (an agency of the
Department of Homeland Security) to grant a petition allowing a male non-
citizen married (in Iowa) to a male U.S. citizen to apply for lawful
permanent residence status; the suit named Secretary of Homeland Security
Janet Napolitano, along with Attorney General Eric Holder, who heads
DOJ, the federal department charged with enforcing federal statutes. 33
The individual officer suit workaround is explained (and often derided)
as a legal fiction, but one accepted as necessary to preserve sovereign
immunity while also ensuring governmental accountability, constitutional
compliance, and vindication of individual liberty. 34 The core fiction is that
the individual officer, not the government, is the true party in interest and
the injunction does not run against the state, at least so long as the
injunction simply compels adherence to federal law and does not limit state
control over its treasury. 35 A second fiction is that the injunction runs only
against the individual officer, even though it also binds that individual's
successor-in-office who was never a party to the original action. Thus, had
Perry been resolved before Jerry Brown became governor, the injunction
entered against Schwarzenegger would have continued in force against
Brown.
In fact, the availability of individual officer suits is not a legal fiction but
an inherent component of sovereignty and sovereign immunity. Under
English common law, while the king could not be sued eo nomine given
divine right and royal dignity, his ministers and officers were subject to a
full range of prerogative writs in the courts of law and chancery, including
injunctions. 36 Requiring the suit to run against the governor or attorney,
rather than California or the United States, simply imports this into the
sovereignty of republican governments. Moreover, as John Harrison has
argued, Ex parte Young itself was well grounded in common law and
English sovereign immunity. 37 Young was, at bottom, an anti-injunction
suit, one of the core actions available in equity: the potential defendant in a
31. See, e.g., Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart (I'OPA), 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1638
(2011).
32. Alexander A. Reinert. Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its
Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REv. 809. 811 n.2 (2010).
33. Revelis v. Napolitano, No. 11 C 1991, 2012 WL 28765, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5,
2012).
34. VOPA, 131 S. Ct. at 1638; Gey, supra note 16, at 1654.
35. 'OPA. 131 S. Ct. at 1638.
36. Jaffe, supra note 14, at 1-2.
37. See generally John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REv. 989 (2008).
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threatened action at law (a criminal prosecution for violating state laws
governing railroad rates) brought an action in equity, asserting as his claim
what would be a defense in the action at law (the unconstitutionality of the
state law) and requesting an injunction barring prosecution of the action in
law (enforcement of the state laws). 38  Sovereign immunity is not
implicated in such a case, because the sovereign is not immune from the
assertion of a defense in an action at law.
It is tempting to simply accept sovereign immunity because, as John
Jeffries argues, it "almost never matters." 39 Private plaintiffs can sue state
or federal officers for injunctions and damages and the federal government
can sue state governments (in their own names) for violations of federal
law. 40 Sovereign immunity does not relieve the government or its officers
of the duty to comply with the Federal Constitution and it does not, as a
general matter, prevent constitutional enforcement; it "simply makes
enforcement more difficult for private individuals." 41 As the marriage
equality cases demonstrate, plaintiffs will have a chance to make their
constitutional arguments to the federal court and future enforcement of a
constitutionally infirm law will be halted.
But this relies on a faulty premise. It begins as if sovereign immunity,
softened by the inherent workaround of only mildly inconvenient individual
officer suits, must be our default. In other words, sovereign immunity is
"no big deal" because other enforcement mechanisms remain.
When we acknowledge the inconsistency between sovereign immunity as
applied to a legal entity and republican government, however, the default
changes. If we are concerned with the "dignity" of a person (i.e., a king)
whose ultimate authority is deemed divinely conferred, the inconvenience
or increased complexity of individual litigation perhaps is acceptable in the
balance. But ultimate authority in a republican system does not rest with
the legal entity of the government body, so there is no "dignity" to protect.
The increased inconvenience and enforcement complexity needlessly
burdens the process of constitutional litigation without any countervailing
dignitary benefit.
It is clear to everyone-including government officials themselves-that
even a suit for an anti-enforcement injunction is one against the
government. 42 Although not subject by name to the injunction, it is the
government that will be limited in its future enforcement conduct and thus
in its sovereign authority. If the governor is enjoined from enforcing the
state prohibition on same-sex marriage, then the State of California is
enjoined from enforcing that prohibition. If the Secretary of Homeland
38. Id. at 997-98.
39. John C. Jeffries, Jr.. In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA.
L. REv. 47, 49 (1998).
40. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754-57 (1999).
41. Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Falling on the Federal Government? State Sovereign
Immunity, the Section Five Power, and the Federal Balance, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1551, 1561
(2003) (reviewing NOONAN, supra note 15).
42. Jaffe, supra note 14, at 39.
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Security is enjoined from enforcing the DOMA-dictated limitation on
recognizing same-sex marriages in immigration matters, the DHS-and
thus the United States-is enjoined from making certain decisions about the
status of married persons. This demonstrates the largely symbolic nature of
sovereign immunity (at least in actions not directly seeking monetary
remedies), which achieves little beyond making constitutional litigation
more analytically and procedurally complex.
Moreover, the DOMA cases demonstrate that naming the entity in a
constitutional action is not an unbearable burden. Consider Windsor v.
United States, an action by a spouse-executor to recover more than
$360,000 in taxes that would have been waived if federal law recognized
her valid New York same-sex marriage. 43 The United States was the
named defendant in that case because the government has formally waived
sovereign immunity in civil actions seeking refunds of taxes erroneously or
unlawfully collected, including, as in Windsor, when the tax was collected
in violation of the Constitution. 44 It is difficult to see why the same, simple
captioning procedure should not work in all constitutional injunction cases.
Federal law should not be concerned with how or how competently the state
defends itself; the burden is on the state if it fails to designate someone to
defend it or empowers someone who does a poor job.
II. STANDING AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Hall is correct that Article III requires an interested defendant. The
named officer-defendants in the marriage equality cases (themselves or
through the governmental department charged with defending them) have
declined to defend the constitutionality of the prohibitions or have chosen to
do so in a way likely to result in the laws being invalidated in court.45
Were Governor Brown or Secretary Napolitano truly the real party in
interest in their respective cases, either could take a confession of judgment
against them or otherwise proceed in a way that ensures a non-reviewable
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and a court order barring enforcement of
the laws.
Unlike the named officer-defendants, the individuals and groups seeking
to enter these cases are not directly affected by any judgment or injunction.
This is why Hall and the federal courts are forced to speak of this in terms
of standing and intervention. An Article III case or controversy does not
exist if the new defending party is neither responsible for the
unconstitutional conduct (because they were not enforcing an
unconstitutional law) nor subject to the ultimate injunction barring
enforcement (because they are not responsible for future enforcement). Put
simply, an affected party is no longer defending the case. 46
43. 797 F. Supp. 2d 320, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
44. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (2006).
45. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Revelis v. Napolitano, No. 11
C 1991, 2012 WL 28765. at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5. 2012): Windsor. 797 F. Supp. 2d at 322:
Hall, supra note 9, at 1541.
46. Hall, supra note 9, at 1551.
83
FORDHAMLA WREVIEWRES GESTAE
In reality, of course, both Napolitano and Brown are nonine stand-ins for
legal entities that themselves cannot be sued eo nonine only because of
sovereign immunity; the entities are the real interested defendants. The
scramble of individuals and groups trying to get into these cases-
Congress, BLAG, state legislators, county officials, private advocacy
groups, popular initiative sponsors-are only seeking to substitute as
nonine stand-ins.
The standing concerns disappear if we stop demanding stand-ins and let
actions proceed against the entity in its own name. A government entity is
unquestionably an interested defendant in litigation challenging the
constitutionality of that entity's laws. The State of California has an
interest in the challenge to Prop. 8, and the United States has an interest in
the challenges to DOMA. If either entity is named as a defendant, we have
a dispute between adverse and interested parties who will be restricted by
the judgment and have their conduct regulated by an injunction. We
therefore are ensured a party with standing to defend and to appeal any
adverse judgment.
III. WHO REPRESENTS GOVERNMENT?
Eliminating sovereign immunity as a part of U.S. law eliminates the
standing issue that Hall addresses in his article. The Perry plaintiffs simply
could have named the State of California (recognized as a person under
section 1983) as defendant; the DOMA plaintiffs could have named the
United States, or the Department of Homeland Security, Department of
Treasury, or any other federal agency that refused, in light of DOMA, to
recognize a valid same-sex marriage. The entity defendant has standing to
defend and to pursue the case throughout the Article III judiciary-they
would be adversely affected by a judgment and subject to any relief
obtained, they have an interest in the outcome, and they have an incentive
to litigate vigorously.
Of course, a legal entity only acts through its officers. We thus still must
consider what happens when the officers charged by law with litigating the
government's position decline to defend the laws or adopt a less than
favorable legal defense. Even if government is sued in its own name, we
still face the procedural complication that has arisen in the marriage
equality cases.
What has changed is the nature of the problem. BLAG or the Prop. 8
sponsors are seeking permission to litigate the government's interests, not
their own. Rather than asking the standing question of who is sufficiently
interested in the case to be a defendant or appellant, we now ask who gets to
represent, defend, and make arguments as, and on behalf of, the interested
named government entity. That is, in a system of divided authority, who is
the government?
Importantly, however, this is not an Article III or constitutional standing
question. Because there is a case or controversy between the plaintiffs and
the named defendant government entity whose law is being challenged, the
Constitution should not care who speaks for the government in this
84 [Vol. 80
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litigation. This instead becomes a sub-constitutional question of how a
particular republican government elects to structure itself (within
constitutional parameters) and how it elects to divide powers among the
several branches and between government officers and members of the
public. It is a question of how government will defend its laws in court and
who will litigate on its behalf. To the extent a government makes bad
choices in whom it authorizes to defend it or in how its interests will be
defended, the federal courts do not save litigants from bad representation or
bad litigation strategy.
A state should have virtually unlimited power to identify those
authorized to represent it and to provide a constitutional defense on its
behalf. This could include a potentially competing range of executive
branch officers, legislators, citizens, and citizen groups; the state also could
establish hierarchy or order of power to represent. This remains a pure
question of state law and state legislative discretion (limited perhaps only
by the Guarantee Clause47); federal courts must defer to state legislative
choices and, when necessary, use certification to have the state supreme
court resolve disputed questions as to who represents the state in a given
case. The federal court must abide by the state court determination of state
law. Unlike standing, there should be no federal constitutional overlay. 48
Federal law should not be concerned with how the state government
defends itself.
It is telling that this is how the Ninth Circuit and the California Supreme
Court resolved the certified question in Perry. The Ninth Circuit asked the
California Supreme Court to address whether the initiative sponsors had
particular interests under state law that it could protect in litigation. In
answering the certified question, the state court focused instead on the
sponsors' authority under the state constitution and state statutory law to
defend the validity of popularly enacted laws on behalf of California itself.
The power to effectively become the state was a necessary and inherent
incident of direct democracy and the power of citizens to create state law
directly; without it, elected officials could undermine the initiative process
and render popularly enacted laws nullities by refusing to enforce or
defend. 49  The state court discussed but expressly declined to resolve
whether the sponsors held any personal or special interests or rights as a
group, apart from the state's interests.50 When the case returned to federal
court, the Ninth Circuit accepted the state court's conclusion and
recognized the sponsor's power to appeal on behalf of the state. 51
The federal court's unqualified acceptance of the state court
determination suggests that it understood that the sponsors were not really
47. U.S. CONST. art. IV. § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government .... ).
48. Cf Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. 504 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1992) (considering
Article III standing requirements even when the plaintiff was statutorily authorized to sue).
49. Perry V], 265 P.3d 1002, 1024-25 (Cal. 2011).
50. Id. at 1014-15.
51. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2012).
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litigating on their own behalf (which would necessitate a showing of
personal stake) but on behalf of the State of California, the real party in
interest that does have a personal stake. Because the individuals were not
truly representing their own interests, there was no need to consider
whether they satisfied Article III's standing requirements in their own right.
At the federal level, Congress has done much the same. Under federal
law, DOJ is charged with representing the United States in court and with
defending all federal laws. 52 Federal law also requires the attorney general
to notify Congress when DOJ has decided not to defend a law. 53
Notification allows Congress to authorize others, such as the Office of
Senate Legal Counsel or BLAG, to step in to defend and argue the validity
of the law as the purported representative of the United States. 54
Once allowed to defend the government's interests, that party defends for
all purposes. In Windsor, when BLAG sought to intervene as a defendant,
DOJ argued that BLAG's intervention should be limited only to arguing in
support of DOMA's constitutionality under rational basis review (which
DOJ no longer would do), while DOJ would retain the authority to lead the
government defense, particularly on matters of procedure. 55 The court
rejected that argument, however, concluding that BLAG was permitted to
intervene as a full party defendant, able to make all substantive and
procedural arguments and decisions it sees fit. 56
The struggle is to control who gets to be the United States in this
litigation, a choice left to Congress (subject, perhaps, only to the President's
authority to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" 57). Congress
must ensure that someone is identified and empowered by law to represent
the United States, but the fault lies with Congress if it fails to do so
completely or thoughtfully enough, or if the designated defender fails to
perform competently. In fact, DOMA reveals such a failure-Congress
never granted BLAG statutory authority to litigate federal constitutional
interests.58 The issue has not been pushed in court, however, so Congress
has not been disadvantaged by its legislative mistake.
One might object that entity litigation, and the possibility of competing
actors seeking to litigate on behalf of the entity, makes it more difficult for
government to speak with a single voice in court. This objection merits
several responses.
First, the burden for ensuring one voice rests with the political branches
to establish clear and specific rules and processes for determining who
speaks for the government, how, when, and in what order. Federal courts
52. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006).
53. Id. § 530(d).
54. 2 U.S.C. §§ 288a 288n (2006); see also Windsor v. United States. 797 F. Supp. 2d
320, 323 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
55. Windsor, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 324-25.
56. Id.
57. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. See generally Devins & Prakash, supra note 7.
58. Hall, supra note 12, at 1578-79: see Windsor. 797 F. Supp. 2d at 323 n.2 (stating
that no federal statute authorizes the House or any subpart of the House to intervene to
defend the constitutionality of a federal statute).
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must then defer to those statutory rules. Second, there may, in fact, be a
benefit to having multiple voices in litigation. In a system of separated
powers, power is divided among multiple branches, departments, and actors
who may disagree on what the "governmental" position should be. Courts
benefit from that disagreement and from hearing all competing positions,
which may help them resolve the case more accurately through the
adversary process. 59 Third, this approach is both democracy and litigation
reinforcing. If the executive officer primarily responsible for representing
the government in its constitutional defense chooses not to do so, she must
make and announce that choice publicly and she must deal with any popular
fallout at the ballot box. At the state level, where all executive branch
officers often are independently elected, this may have real teeth. At the
same time, the legislature can ensure that the government is always fully
represented and able to defend its position in court by designating multiple
actors who can step into the breach in a case of non-defense or under-
defense.
CONCLUSION
As a doctrinal matter, eliminating sovereign immunity and switching to
entity litigation can be achieved fairly easily. No constitutional amendment
is necessary, since the Constitution says nothing of the federal government
having sovereign immunity. 60 Immunity derives from the Supreme Court's
understanding of "universally received opinion," an understanding that the
Court could reject. Broad state sovereign immunity is similarly a product
ofjudicial interpretation rather than constitutional text, which the Court also
can alter by decision. 61 Moreover, states could be made subject to suit on
constitutional claims simply by recognizing that a state is a person for
purposes of section 1983, either by the Court overturning two of its prior
decisions 62 or by Congress amending section 1983.63 These changes also
render Ex parte Young superfluous; there is no need for that workaround
doctrine allowing suits against responsible executive officers if the entity
can be sued directly and by name, bringing the case caption in line with
reality.
Rejecting state sovereign immunity still leaves the Eleventh Amendment,
which textually bars suits against states by citizens of other states in federal
court. 64 But once we eliminate ideas of state sovereign immunity, two
understandings of the Amendment's language remain, neither a significant
hurdle to enabling people to sue states for constitutional injunctions. Under
59. Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 914, 919-20 (2012)
(discussing the benefits of Congress speaking on its own behalf in federal constitutional
litigation).
60. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 1205.
61. Id. at 1205. 1224.
62. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-67 (1989); Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332, 340-43 (1979).
63. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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the "diversity" interpretation, the Eleventh Amendment only prohibits
diversity actions between a state and citizen of another state, but not federal
question actions, such as the federal constitutional claims at issue in
Perry.65 Under the "plain language" approach, the Eleventh Amendment
bars all claims against a state by a citizen of another state, including those
based on federal law, 66 meaning that a citizen of another state cannot sue a
state to enjoin an unconstitutional law. While a small number of
constitutional claims unfortunately may be barred, the majority of
constitutional challenges to state laws are brought by citizens of that state.
Without question, the argument presented here has never been the law in
the United States, although it has much to recommend it as a matter of
"political theory and plain justice." 67 It is a legal position much to be
hoped for, not only in light of the already expressed criticisms of sovereign
immunity, but also in light of the complexity of individual-defendant
litigation and the confusion that arises when an individual defendant refuses
to defend. Entity-centered litigation, without sovereign immunity, is more
consistent with the American concept of popular sovereignty. It also is
procedurally simpler and better able to handle procedural anomalies, such
as those that have arisen in the marriage equality cases.
65. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706. 760 (1999) (Souter. J.. dissenting) (citing Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996)).
66. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 1205-06; Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words
of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342, 1368 (1989).
67. Young, supra note 41, at 1567.
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